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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
AMERICAN GYPSUM TRUST, a
common law trust, and JOHN PAUL
JONES, S. LEWIS CRANDALL,
JOHN RUSSELL RITTER, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-vs-

Case No.
12887

GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.

•

Hrief of Appellant GeorgiaPacific Corporation
STATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action to recover damages
claiming that defendants had breached the terms of a
certain mineral lease agreement and further had violated the provisions of the Utah anti-trust statute, § 501-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Defendants counterclaim for amounts due on the basis of overpayment of
the profit royalty.
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The two personal def cndants were dismissed from
the action by the lower court and, in view of the fact
that neither side appealed from these dismissals, their
rights are not involved in this appeal.
On l\larch 28, 1972, the lower court cnten·d judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Appellant '
Georgia-l>acific in the sum of $315,72.J..18 plus interest.
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
court held that Georgia-Pacific had breached the re·
quiremcnts provision of the ]case and had failed to account properly for the profit royalty as provided for in
the agreement. In its judgment, the court ordered that
in the future .A ppcllant operate its Sigurd plant to
produce at least 128,5!19,000 square f ect of wallboard
per year for the term of the lease so long as there were
mi11eal1le and proeessable rcsen"es on the premises and
there was a sufficient market in a specified area to
absorb that quantity. ( C. 500). The court further or·
de red that the A ppc II ant must thereafter account to the
Respondent for the profit royalties in the manner set ,
forth in Rxhibits 139-141 as modified in the judgmenl
The court found that Appellant had not violaterl
§ i3-1-2. Utah Code Annotated (C. 496) and had prop·
erly accounted for the cost of paper used by the Sigurd
plant in calculating the profit royalty. ( C. 495). Ho,:·
ever, Appellant's counterclaim was dismissed and this
dismissal was based partially upon the method of ac·
counting for the cost of paper supplied to the Sigurd
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plant. To reconcile the dismissal with the findings of
the court on costs of paper, the trial judge, in determining the monetary amount to be awarded, offset the
added paper costs as accounted for by Appellant against
the damages claimed by Respondents. ( C. 500).
The court denied Respondents' claim for attorney's
fees and after entry of judgment, Appellant timely
filed its Notice of Appeal and Respondents filed a
Cross-appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to reverse the judgment of the
trial court and more specifically the holdings: that it
had breached the lease agreement, that Respondents
should be awarded damages therefor, that Appellant
must account for the profit royalty under the lease in
the manner as set forth in Exhibit 139-141 as modified
by the trial court, and that Appellant must produce at
least 128,539,00 square feet of wallboard per year under
the conditions mentioned. Appellant also seeks to reverse
the holding that it was not entitled to recover the damages claimed in its counterclaim.
Respondents seek a reversal of that part of the
lower court's decision which denies them any attorney's
fees.
STATE.MENT OF FACTS
Georgia-Pacific, hereinafter designated as Appellant, is an assignee of the lessee's interest in a mineral
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lease agreement which was prepared hy the lessor's at.
torney. Ju1lgc \Vil1is Hitter. (Ah. mo) 11 It was executed by the parties on the uth clay of N ovemher, 1946,
and a copy is attached to lhe Hespondcnts' Complaint.
The lease provisions of primary importance to the
issues before this Court obligate the lessee to take its
gypsum ore requirements from the leased premises and
to pay eleven cents ( 11 ¢) per ton on all ore mined, with
a minimum royalty of $12,000 per year. (C. 22, 23).In
addition, the lessee was required to pay a profit royal·
ty of 7% based upon sound accounting principles.
(c. 24).
The original
was an individual acting for a
group of persons who intended to form \V cstern Gyp·
sum Company, a corporation, to operate property lo·
rated at Sigtml. Utah. (Ab. 180-81). Constructionof
n gypsum plant on the premises was part of the obliga·
tic1n assumed by the lessee urnler the terms of the ]ease.
( C. 2{)). Thus, to carry out the intent of the original
parties, immediately after the lease agreement was ex·
ecuted, it was assigned to the \\T estern Gypsum Com·
pany. ( Al1. 188) . Another gypsum products manufac·
turing company, Certain-Teed Products Corporation,
aided the imlividuals in fi111mcing the venture and, by
I/Reference numbers designated herein refer to the following
parts of the record:
8
(Ab ..... ) designated references to the abstract of the Tran·
cript of the trial court proceedings.
.
b
(C ..... ) designates the Record on Appeal as Submitted Y
the district court.
.
at
(Ex ..... ) designate:i the exhibits admitted as evidence
trial.
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agreement and through the exercise of options, ultimately became the sole stockholder of \V estern Gypsum
Company. (Ah. 9G, 188, 189). Thereafter, in 1956 all
of Certain-Teed's gypsum products plants, including
Sigurd, were spun off into Bestwall Gypsum Company, a separnte corporation. (Ah. 404, 532). That corporation thereafter dissolved 'Vestern G y p sum
Company and
all interests under the lease. In
Hl65, nestwall was merged into Appellant which then
became the lessee of the property under the lease. (Ex.
100). All of the lease assignments and transfers were
consented to by Respondent, American Gypsum Trust.
(Ab. 195).
From the time lV estern Gypsum Company was
merged into Bestwall in 1956, the respective lessees
operated more than one gypsum plant and had several
sources of supply for the raw gypsum rock. (Ex. 100).
While the requirements provision of the lease seems now
to he of critical importance to llespomlents, there is
a total absence of nny evidence that they ever claimed
or demanded that Bestwall, as lessee for some nine years,
supply other than the Sigurd plant with gypsum mined
on the leased property. Appellant acquired the five other
plants in addition to the Sigurd plant upon the merger
with Bestwall in 1965. (Ex. 100). Yet, Respondents
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neYer registered a complaint with Appellant over its
use of raw gypsum mined from properties other than
Sigurd until the Complaint was filed in this action,
From the early rn.>o's to as late as 19;38, Certain.
Teed and Best wall supplietl the 'Vestern X ew l\Iexico.
Arizona-Southern California market area with gypsum
products from the Union (
Company plant in
Phoenix, Arizona, in which they had a finaneial interest.
(Ah. 118-19, Ex. 110). From that time until l!Hi3, the
Southern California market was suppliell hy both the
Acme, Texas and Sigurd plants. (Ah. 412). Between
HHW aml HW8, the
ew Orleans plant was dismantled
arnl moved to Acme, Texas to increase the existing plant
capacity there and increase the shipments to Southern
California from that plant. (Ab. 424). In 1967, Appel·
lant acquired the LoYell, 'Vyoming plant and com·
me11ced shipping products from that plant to the
Pacific Northwest. ( Exs ..59, fl8).
Notwithstanding these changes in marketing pat·
terns, Hespondent did not at any time complain of any
violation of the requirements provisions of the lease
agreement. The requirements language does not refer
to or define anv "market area" to be sened exclusive·
ly hy the
( C. 26). Respondent never asserted a
claim that the "requirements" lanbiuage embraced a
particular geographic area in over 20 years of lease per·
formance and administration or during negotiations
lea,ling to the
which precipitated this lawsuit,
or indeed in the original complaint. (Ab. 199, 202, 525,

7
Ex. I (i3). The unique "market area" requirements
found by the court below were not synthesized by J udgc
Ritter or his client, or communicated to the lessee until
Respondent was met with a motion for partial summary
judgment in this action and, in response thereto, filed
an amended complaint. ( C. 440).

526,

The economic history of the gypsum industry becomes relevant to this action because of the trial court's
anrl Hespondents' interpretation of the requirements
provision of the lease and the damages based thereon.
That history shows that during the first twenty years
of the lease period, the industry experienced boom years,
paralleling the post-\\! orl<l \Var II housing boom. Plant
capacity and wallboard sales tripled from 1945 to 1960.
(Ah. 618). In the early 1960's, gypsum wallboard
largely replaced other forms of wall covering. Therefore, the growth of the gypsum industry was attributable both to the growth in housing and also the transition
from other wall coverings to gypsum wallboard. (Ab.
618). This growth phenomena created such a great demand that most plants had a backlog of orders and
could pick and choose their customers and the market
areas in whieh they desired to ship. (Ab. 432). Because of the growth and demand characteristics of the
in 1lustry, gypsum wallboard sold at a premium price.
This was particularly true on the West Coast. (Ab.
620).

The years 1960 to 1964 were described by both
economists and management personnel in the gypsum
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industry as the peak years of the industry. (Ab. 43 3
()19, ()20). The boom that took place <luring that period
led to optimistic forecasts for the future. As a result
gypsum manufacturers began to plan for new plants
and to increase productivity in old ones to meet what
they thought would be an even greater boom. (Ab. 62021). By the mi<l-1960's, the market area west of the
Continental Divide was served by 21 plants where
formerly there had been only 12 or 13. (Ab. 434).
J

Appellant increased its productive capacity in the
'Vest during the time its c0mpetitors were building new
plants and increasing capacity. In 1966, its New Or·
leans plant was dismantled and in 1968 it was set up
in Acme, Texas to increase that plant's capacity. (Ab.
424).

In 1967, Appellant became aware of the fact that
a nearly completed gypsum plant located at Lovell,
'Vyomi11g was for sale an<l that several of its competi·
tors were considering it., purchase. (Ab. 466). It de·
terminecl that the purchase of this plant would discour·
age competitors from impinging upon the market area
in close proximity to the Sigurd plant. To accommodate
the planned \Vestern expansion, Appellant set a goal
of expanding its \\T estern market share between 13%
and 15% and actually nchieve<l an increase to 16%. (Ab.
100). By the acquisition of the Lovell plant and the ex·
pansion of Acme, Appellant increased its proportionate
part of the total plant capacity of all manufacturers
with plants in the 'Vestern market area from 10% to
11 % in 1960 and 11 % to 12% in 1968-1969. (Ab. 630).
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The booming demand for housing reached its peak
011 the \Vest Coast in JUG3. Prices followed the trend
and as a result, the priee of gypsum reached its peak
in 19o4. (Ah. ll:!O) . After the peak years of 1963 and
l !Hl4, reverses were encountered as the housing and the
gypsum markets started to skid downward. (Ab. 633).
The new plant capacity mentioned above came on
stream about the same time as the housing decline. Because of the economic forces of increased supply and
decreased demand, there was a sharp break in the price
of gypsum wallboard, particularly on the West Coa<.;•
This break commenced in the latter part of 1964 and
extended through 196.5. (Ab. 621). There was a slight
rebound in gypsum products prices in 1967 and then a
further precipitous decline in prices starting in 1968.
(Ab. 4:3G-:37, H22-2:-J).

The depressed market conditions in the industry
demanded innovations in merchandising and competitive
marketing changes in order to stay in business. (Ab.
441, 452-5:}, 464).

Appellant's major competitors with plants in the
San Francisco and Los Angeles market area moved
away from rail car shipments and instituted delivery by
truck. (Ab. 435) . The rest of the industry followed suit
and went even further. U.S. Gypsum opened a warehouse in the San Francsico market area. (Ab. 452). By
the end of 1966 and going into 1967, the 'Vest Coast
market area was converted into substantially a truck
market. (Ab. 453) . Georgia-Pacific, upon the acquisi·
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tion of BestwaJI i11 1964, was in an immediate position
to implement new and irmovative ideas to minimize ex.
pe11ses and increase its market share in the lagging
market by marketing gypsum through its existing distrihutio11 centers. (Ab. 445). This new marketing concept gave Georgia-Pacific a competitive advantage in
that it could bring carloads of gypsum and its other
products into a distribution center, assemble various
types of specialized materials to suit customer needs, and
ship to many classes of customers which theretofore were
economically unable to purchase even a single truckload
of gypsum wall hoard. (Ab. 678-79). It was this inno·
vation in marketing technique which enabled Appellant
to increase its market share in the \Vestem market area
to IG%. (Ah. 624). However, its competitors were not
so fortunate, and some were forced to close down plants.
Three of the plants which were shut down were closer
to the major Sigurd market area than was the Sigurd
plant arnl one was approximately the same distance
from the market. (Ab. 440). The plants which became
nonoperational arc shown on Exhibit 158 by a cross
p]ac:cd in the plant identifying symhol. Without the dis·
trihution center warehousing and delivery concepts and
other policy changes initiated by Georgia-Pacific, the
Sigurd plant would also have had to close. (Ab. 364).
Yet for the years 1966 through 1970, it operated at an
average of 85% of capacity as compared to 83% during
the years 1960-1964 (Ex. 162), admittedly the peak
years in the industry.
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Parngraph 2 ( Jj:) of the lease provides that the
lessee aJ1Cl his assigns shall carry on the business in a
prude11t and businesslike manner for all interests concerned. ( C. 24). The facts above stated demonstrate
the economic comli tions under which A ppcllant was required to make its business decisions. Those decisions
were upheld as in accordance with the lease by experts
in the fields of economics and marketing. (Ab. 643,
678).
Appellant also changed the Bestwall method of
accounting for the gypsum plants to conform to that
used in accounting for its other operations. This included the profit center accounting concept which reflects the profit and loss as to each plant, such as
Sigurd. (Ab. 444-4.5) . Under this accounting concept,
the Sigurd plant "sold" its product to the distribution
centers mueh the same way as Bestwall had sold Sigurd
products to wholesale dealers who could purchase carload lots. (Ab. 167) .
During all of the period of the lease, the Respondents had access to the books of all lessees, and regular
audits were made. No conflict of any proportion as to
accom1li11g procedures under the lease occurred prior to
the assignment to Appellant. In 1956, a deviation from
standard accounting principles for the profit royalty
was agreed to (Ex. 113) between the Respondents and
Bestwall, then the lessee. It was agreed that general
adr_ninistrative, sales and advertising costs ( GS&A)
would be based upon 10% of the cost of goods sold.
This method of calculating GS&A was used rather than
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actual costs because three corporations, Certain-Teed
'
Bestwall Sales Corp. and Bestwall were aU providing
GS&A services and it was, therefore, difficult to make
allocation of actual cost of those items. (Ex. 113).
Generally speaking, prior to the acquisition of
Bestwall by Georgia-Pacific the sales price used as a
basis for calculating the royalty profit was the price
chargccl to Sigur<l's carload customers. (Ah. 457-.58).
At that time, the customer was primarily a dealer who
performed all warehousing, distribution and sales
functions beyond the railhead. (Ab. 53H-37, 540-41}.
For those services, the dealer was given a functional
discount from the list price. (Ab. 167). A ftcr the acqui·
sition of Bestwall, the distribution centers already
established by Georgia-Pacific for marketing its other
products performed all of those functions and as previously mentioned, (Ah. 540-41) this permitted
Georgia-Pacific to better service its customers at no
acl1litio11aI- cost to them. \Vhrn the distribution warehousing and sales functions were performed by the carload purchasers, the costs of those services to him were
credited on his purchase price. This was accomplished
hy giving him a 9.8 % discount from list price. (Ab.
165-67). \Vhen these functions were transferred to and

performed by the distribution center, the discount to the
wholesale purchaser was eliminated, but under the profit
center accounting method, it was credited to the distribution center. (Ab. 161-66). Thus, the purchase price
to the end customer remained the same, the only differ·
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ence being that prior lo the acquisition, the wholesale
pmchaser paid in cash and received the 9.8% credit for
his sel'\'ices; now, the distribution center receives the
!l.8% credit for the cost of services. (Ab. 162, 166).
Jn HHi7-G8, Appellant reviewed the accounting

practices pre,·io11sly used in computing the lease royalties in light of the lease provisions and its accounting
methods a1Hl thereafter recomputed the profit royalties
due Respondents. (.Ab. 780). This resulted in the computation of an overpayment by Appellant to Respondent for those years in the amount of $41,879.00.
(Ab. 780). Re."pondents protested the decreased royalty
based upon Appellant's methods of acro1111ti11g :1rnl the accounting modification precipitated
disputes and eventually this lawsuit.
Hespondents adrnnced the hypothesis that they
shoulcl be credited with the sales price to the end customer hut that costs for handling and distribution could
not be deducted in that they were a sales function only
anll therefore were suhject to the 10% GS&A agreement made with Bestwall. (Ex. 1G3, Ab. U07). On the
other hand, Georgia-Pacific claimed that to follow this
accounting method woulcl he contrary to good accounting principles as required by the lease and that the
proper procedure would he to use the sales price to the
distribution center under the profit center accounting
method (Ab. 142-43, 723-24), and in the alternative,
if the additional sales price generated hy the distrihu·
tion center was to be included in the sales price to the

encl customer, then all costs in association with the sales
should also be included. (Ah. 72:3-724). Appellant's
opinion was that the fundamental basis for proper ac.
counting is to match against all sales, all of the costs
which relate to those sales. (Ah. 723-24).
Paragraph 2 ( E.) of the lease agreement provides
that in the event of any disagreement between lessor
and lessee with respect to items of either in<'ome or deductions for determining net profit the parties shall he
hound hy the final determination of the Bureau of Internal Rcvem1e for the year in which the dispute arises.
( C. 24). 'Vhile the clispute was not referred to the
Bureau for final determination, its regulations set guidelines for proper accounting principles. They pro\·ide
that in determining profitahility at a gfren point in a
production chain the standard to be applied in every
instance is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer clealing at
arms length with another uncontrolled taxpayer. (Ab.
721). Using that principle as a guideline, the debits and
credits as between the distribution center and the com·
pany should be treated as if they were dealing at arms
length and as unrelated parties. (Ab. 719-20). This was
the method employed by Georgia-Pacific in determin·
ing profits for royalty purposes. (Ab. 722-23) .

1.5

POINT I

THE THL\L COURT ElUlED BOTH
LEU:ALLY AND FACTUALLY IN
EXTEHING ITS FINDING OF FACT
NO. 27 AND BY FAILING TO ADOPT
APPEJ,J,ANT'S PllOPOSED FINDIXG V(2).
This point arises by virtue of the fact that Finding
No. 27 adoptc'l hy the trial judge is wholly inconsistent
with the clear and unambiguous language in the lease
agreement a1Hl therefore improperly creates obligations
and liabilities against .Appellant. Moreover, in so finding, the trial judge violated basic rules governing the
construction of written contracts.

The finding is as follows:
"\Vith respect to the requirements provision of the lease, the Court finds that GeorgiaPacific Corporation is obligated to operate the
Sigurd Plant at not less than the average 1965,
HHifi and HW7 productions levels ( 128,539,000
square feet), pnwided only that GeorgiaPacific Corporation has a sufficient market to
sell that quantity of gypsum products in the
States of California, Oregon, \Vashington,
Nevada, I <laho, Utah, \V estern .Montana,
W estcrn \V yoming, and \Ves tern Colorado,
i.e., the historic market area of Sigurd as reflected by plaintiffs' Exhibit I received in evidence herein." ( C. 490).
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This finding is the product of a theory belatedly
conjured up by Hesponclents after litigation was commenced. Contrary thereto and from the Yery hegiuning
the principle pressed on the trial court by Appellant
was set out in its proposed Finding of Fact No. V (2)
which was rejected hy the judge. It was as follows:
"Paragraph 5 of the lease which sets forth
the requirements provision applies only to the
requirements of the Sigurd plant and does not
obligate the defendants to sene any particular geographical market area." ( C. 733)
The lease agreement which was entered into he·
tween the original parties is very specific and detailed
in its enumeration of the obligations placed upon the
lessee. It was drafted by one learned in the law, .Judge
"\Villis Ritter (Ah. 178) an<l the obligations imposed
were made part of the ]ease after lengthy negotiations
between the parties. (Ab. 194-95). They are as fo)]ows:
(a)

Payments:
11 ¢ per ton royalty for the gypsum taken

from the lease premises; a minimum royalty of

$12,000 per year with a tonnage roya1ty to

apply thereon; and, 7% net profit royalty based
upon the profits manufactured from the gypsum taken from the leased premises.
(b)

Operations:

17

To operate the business of the lessee in a
prudent and businesslike manner for all interests conecrned; to erect a factory at Sigurd,
Utah, for manufacturing gypsum products;
and, to take all of its requirements of gypsum
from the leased premises so long as the kind and
quality of rock need could be Mtpplied therefrom. ( C. 22-26).
In this llrief, we attack the entire finding for it
fixes an obligation on Appellant to pay Respondet1t1

the basis that it was required to operate the Sigurd
Plant at not less than the average 1965, 1966, 1967 production le,,e ls ( 128,539,000 square feet), provided, that
Appellant had a sufficient market to sell such quantity
of gypsum products in what the court erroneously concluded was the "historic market area of Sigurd".
011

It is to he noted that on this issue the trial court
was dealing with the construction of the requirements
provision of the lease and we, therefore, quote the paragraph in full:

"Fifth: The Lessee further covenants
and agrees to and with the Lessor that all gypsum requirements of the Lessee or his assigns
shall he supplied from the demised premises
hereinahove described, provided rock of the
kind and quality needed can be supplied therefrom."

18
It is obvious from scanning this pro\'ision that it
makes no reference to any obligation to produce at a
given level of production or to supply a particular geographical market area. Thus in finding the market area
described in
No. 27 and in placing a burden
on .Appellant to meet the average of certain yearly production levels, the trial court incorporated into the contract, terms and provisions neither intended nor
contemplated by the parties nor expressed hy them in
their writings.
It is a basic principle of contract law that courts
are not at liberty to rewrite contracts under the guise
of construing its terms and provisions. ill ohr Park
11/anor v. :Mohr, 87 Nev. 107, 424 P.2<l 101, 31 ALR
3rd .513 ( rnu7). This the trial judge did and
his construction went far beyond the hounds of reason .
implication he incorporated into the lease
.l\Ioreover,
burdens which neither the original lessees nor their assignees would have accepted. This sort of construction
is not favored in the law and rewriting contracts by a
court is not permitted, except under the most unusual
circumstances and a upon a showing of absolute necessity by the injmed party. Obviously these conditions are
not present in this case.

In dealing with the principle of implying obligations in contracts with respect to "requirements" and
"output", Professor Corbin states:
"Does the buyer promise 'by implication'
that he will have any needs or requirements,

that he will send in orders during the whole
stated period for the amount of goods that he
has use1l in the past ... or that he will not fail
to keep his business running with its accustomed 11ee1ls and requirements?

* * *

"In both of these classes of cases the
courts haw gct1erally answered the questions
in the negative. They leave the gap unfilled,
no such promises are implied." Corbin on Contracts, § 5G9 at :341 ( 19GO Ed.)

* * *

"Only the least thought is necessary to
realize a 'gap' in an agreement should not be
filled merely because the gap exists. No
promise, or condition of a promise, should be
added hy either implication or judicial construction merely because the parties did not put
it in their wonls of agreement." Corbin on
Contracts ,1mpra, p. 341.
Not only di1l the trial judge fill supposed gaps,
hut the error in the finding becomes more egregious
when consideration is given to the fact that he imposed
obligations as to subjects to which the parties had already directed their attention. In implying obligations,
he entirely ignored the burdens to pay minimum royalties and to construct a plant to manufacture gypsum
products. With respect to agreements carrying similar
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burdens, the better reasoned cases hold that where u
substantial minimum rental is exacted from the lessee
no duty of dewloping the property or developing or
maintaining a market for the lessor's product may be
implied by the court. That principle in this case is
strengthened by the additional requirements placed on
lessees of building a mill, for the cost of that construction enures to the benefit of the lessor.
In Il1lIL Corp. v. Oc11cral Ji'oods Corp., 3G5 F.2d
77 ( :Jrd Cir. 1 !J()G), the court touched on lhe doctrine
of implied obligation in a "requirernents" contract.
There, defernlant ha<l agrce<l to purchase 85 % of its
market requirements from plaintiff. The agreement
was silent as to any duty on the part of defendant to
de,·elop and maintain a market for the product. The
defernla11t commenced use of the product, then ceased
Jistrihution entirely. Plaintiff sued for hreach of a
claimed implied duty on defendant to develop a market
and hence to continue to meet the requirements of the
contract. That case was much stronger for the plaintiff
than is the case at bar because (a) the agreement had
no minimum rental or royalty proYisions and ( b) the
parties expressly applied the "requirements" provision
to a market concept. In dismissing plaintiff's claim, the
comt state<l:
"Cases such as percentage leases and the
distinction which has been drawn regarding an
implied obligation of the lessee to use and
occupy the premises where a substantial mini-
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mum rental is provided and those where there
is no mi11i11111m rental may Le looked to for
some analogy. In these and similar circ11msta11ccs. the seller or lessor is not at the mercy
of the buyer or lessee and the terms of the
contract "·hich provide a s11Lstantial minimum
pay111e11t therefore negative any implication of
a duty to promote. drawn from equitable considerations. The choice lies between implying
a promise to correct an apparent injustiee in
the contract, as against holding the parties to
the bargain which they have made. The latter
altcmative has especial force where the bargain
is the result of elaborate negotiations in which
the parties are aided hy counsel, and in such
circumstances it is easier to assume that a failme to make provision in the agreement resulted
not from ignorance of the problem, but from an
agreement not t(l require it." (p. 81)

May 'L'. Shields, :J93 P.2d 319 (\Vyo. 1964) supports the same principle when dealing with mineral
leases. The court there stated:
"Aecording to the prm'isions of the lease,
the lessee has agreed to carry on 'the mining
operations' in a good and workmanlike manner
according to the standards and customs of the
mining industry. The question arises as to what
mining operations are here referred to, and the
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only possible answer is that prov1s1on applies
to sueh mining operations as are in fact carried
on hy the Lessees.
"'1'1 ierc 1s
. no expressecl prov1s1on f or a

fixccl volume or minimum volume of operations. On the other hand, there is a provision
for payment of a minimum annual royalty.
Ordinarily, such a provision is considered to
supersede and take the place of an implied
covenant for a reasonable amount of production so that no particular amount of production
is required during the primary term of a mining
lease which <'alls for a stipulated minimum
royalty." (Citations omitted). ( p. :324<)
The \'\'yoming Supreme Court affirmed the District Court deeision which held there was no default hy
lessee in the lease agreement for failure to mine any
designated quantity of marble.
\\' e suhmit that the reasoning in the Ililf L case,
:mpra, in dealing with requirements contracts and Jlay
t'. ,')hif'lds, .'11lJJra, in directing itself to minimum royaities in mineral leases, should cause this comt to adopt
the theory that the payment of a minimum royalty
negates any implied covenant to produce at any given
level or maintain a specific geographic market area
when the contract is silent.
AdditionaIJy, we point out that in the original lease
not only is there a contract obligation to pay a minimum
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royalty, but
a burden to construct a gypsum plant.
Tiie obvious purpose of the latter re<1uirement in the
lease was to assure the lessor a means to develop the
leased premises. Again, it is well settled law that where
there is an t:x press provision in a contract fixing a sub·
stantial obligation on a party a court should not add
any additional condition hy implication.
As state1l by the Supreme Court of the United
States in I lawkins v. United States, 96 U.S. 689, 24
L.Bd. 607 ( 1877):
"Implied promises or promises in law exist
only when there is no express promise between
the parties ... Hence, ... a party cannot be
bound by an implied promise when he has made
an express contract to the same subject matter .... " (p. 610)
In the case at bar, the subject matter of developing
the mining property was expressly dealt with by the
original parties to the lease by requiring the lessees to
construct a plant; therefore, the court ened in finding
any other obligations of development, i.e. production
at a given level or the maintenance of a geographic
market area, and this Court should reverse those findings .
.Moving on to anwser one other proposition releto this point, we state categorically that the trial
judge's finding cannot be supported factually by the
record. This for the reason that there is no evidence
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which remotely suggests that the parties e\'cr intended
to fix market areas or production quantities. Only Olle
person testified in support of the Hespornlcnts' position
with respect to these market and production obligations.
.J wlge 'Villis Hitter, the draftsman of the lease, testified over objections that the unexpressed considerations
in granting the lease were management, financial responsibility, ability to sell the product and where the
product was to he sold. (Ah. 184-8;'), 187-88).
'Vhile .1 udge Hitter's testimony before the court
in his deposition awl from his in-court testimony is
rambling and uncertain, when considered most strongly
in fa\'or of the trial judge's views, it does not suggest
that at any time prior to the filing of a motion for sum·
mary judgment in this action on the 14th day of De·
cemhcr there was any contention advanced hy plaintiffs
or their predcecssor that a11y particular market area
must Le supplied cxclusi,·ely by Sigurd u11der the "re·
quireme11ts" provision of the lease. As a matter of fact,
Judge !litter testified that there never was any dispute
until Georgia-Pacific changed its accounting method
and that the only pretrial disputes of the parties related
to those changes. (Ah. I U8) .
This Court can search the record from beginning
to end and will not find one scintilla of eYi<lence that
prior to the amending of Respondents' Complaint, there
was any daim or any discussion between the lessor and
lessee concerning the quantity of ore to be extracted or
the market urea to be served. This absence of testimony

stands out i11 hold relief, for when _Appellant and the
Trustees parted ways it was not over those two matters.
The di fficultics had their genesis only in the change
of accounting procedmcs by Appellant. "rhen difficulties hetween the parties arose, representatives of Appelland met with .Judge Hitter, and according to his testimony, the s11 hjccts discussed were set out in a letter
from ::\fr.
ichcrgall of Appellant's Portland office.
(Ah. mo, ::!O:!-Oa). The pertinent parts of the Niebergall letter. Exhibit !Gil, make no reference whatever
to any dispute or any assertion on the part of Jwlg'4
Ritter for the Trustees and the representative of
pellant either as to the failure of Appellant to maintain
a production level or a geographic marketing area. It is
obvious from .Judge Ritter's testimony that any such
requirements were never communicated to Appellant
or prior lessees under the lease.
It is obvious from the contemporaneous dealings
between the Hcspon<lents and aJI lessees that such an
interpretation of the lease was never considered or contemplated. Glen 'Vilson, a Vice-President of Bestwall
prior to the acquisition of that company by Appellant,
and now a Vice-President of Appellant, testified that
until the time the Hespondents amended their complaint,
he was never aware that there was a market requirement
in the lease. (Ab. 526). He further testified that at the
time Ilestwall was the lessee, it had formulated plans
to expand its gypsum production capabilities in the
West. (Ab.
It would not have entertainecl
such an idea ha<l it known that it could not manufacture
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the neccssarr products for the entire \Vestern United
States at any plant except at Sigmd. If e\·er the con.
duct of the parties shows a construction of the language
of a lease C"ontrary to the finding of the court, this case
is a classic example.
Exhibit 1 (i() sho" s that production under hoth Bestwall and (jeorgia-Paei fie ,·aried widdy from one year
to the next depcncling on market and demand conditions
and it was never set at a given Je,·el. l\Iessrs. Uurch and
sales executives for hoth Uestwall and
Georgia-Pacific, testified that market an:as are in a
continual state of' flux, ehanging from time to time as
production arn] transportalio11 eosts increase or decrease from plant to plant. (1\h. 1:30-:n, ;,aa, 5i0).
These faders, together with the J>rCl"ipitous price deeline experieneed in the \V cstcrn market area, rC(jllired
as a matter of good business judgment the reaJlocation
of market areHs to different plants. (Ab. 4:3;3, 526).
A further point hears discussion. In Kidman v.
IV!iitc, 14 Ptah 2<1142, :37s P.2d 808 (rn<iH), the trial
court had awarded summary judgment for amounts
which included damages for implied obligations not
found in the contract. In rcma<ling the case, the Supreme Court manned largely by the present Judges
state<l:
"There is no question hut that the plaintiff., haYe the burden of affirmatively establising that appellant contracted to perform
the obligations they seek to place on her." (p.
144)
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The plai11tiffs i11 the case at bar have had the opportunity to meet their lmrden of proof and the record evidcnres that they have failed and any base to support
the tria I judge is non-existent.
At this point, we believe it appropriate to call the
Court's attention to the principle of law, which it has
announce<l, that any ambiguity in the contract language
must he resoh·ctl against the draftsman. The trial court
took a reYerse a pp roach to reach the finding here under
re1·iew. The judge below necessarily found an ambiguity
in the lease language and then proceeded to resolve that
an1hig11ity i11 fr1vor of the scrivener. The result of that
process of reasoning was to impose an implied obligation on Appellant in favor of a strained and last-minute
interpretation a1lrn11ced by the principal architect of
the lease. Such an approach in construing a written contract is clearly contrary to the law as announced by this
Court.

In Guinand t 1• 1Valton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d
467 ( HW!)) . Chief Justice Crockett speaking for the
Court state<l:
"The document was drawn by the defendants through their attorney, and therefore, it should be strictly construed against
them . ., ( p. ms)
Citing Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah
2il' 98, 306 P.2d 733 ( 1957) and the Restatement of
Contracts, Yol. I, Sec. 236 (1932).
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Similarly, in Seal 'l'. Tripco, Inc., JG Utah 2d 323,
400 P.2d ;)03 ( HHi."5), this court stated:
"In addressing this problem, certain principles shollld be kept in mind. The first is that
in case of uncertainty as to the meaning of the
contract, it should he construed most strictly
against its framer, Amsco." ( p. 326)
The trial court's Finding of Fact No. 27 flies right
in the face of that rule which should have special treatment in this case because of the experience and expertise
of the llraftsman, Judge \\Tillis Ritter.
Still another point of law illustrates the trial
judge's error in adopting Finding of Fact No. 27. The
effect of the erroneous findings enlarges the contract
obJigatiorls of Georgia-Pacific over those placed on the
original parties and intervening assignees. The burden
placed upon the Appellant with respect to the requirement conditions of the lease should he determined by
using the l)hligations imposed upon the original lessee
as the measuring rod. There is no burden adde<l to the
respecti\'e assignees hy the language and the law is clear
that an assignment alone cannot expand the assignee's
obligation. It is certain that had any conditions as un·
reasonable as those claimed by implication been inserted
in any assignment to assignee's operating other plauts
the assignment would not have been accepted. Common
business sense would have rejected such a burdensome
requirement.
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Facts relernnt to this arhrume11t are set forth in the
trial court's Finding of Fact No. 4 (C. 47G). The original lessee, Sid Eliason, rcprese11tecl himself and three
other individuals, all of whom were former employees
of l r.S. Gypsum, at that time th<:' lea<kr in the gypsum
ind11str\". (Ah. l7!J-80). It was known by the Trustees
that these men intended to form a corporation to be
kJl(mll as 'V cstcrn Gypsum Company. to succeed them
as operators of the property. (Ab. 180). It was also
known by th('m, either before or immediately after the
execution of the lease agreement, that Certain-Teed
Procluets Co111pany, already in the gypsum business,
mmlcl giYe finaneial hacking to the enterprise and would
aequirc an equity interest i11 the venture (Ah. 195) with
an option to aequire all of the stock of 'Vestern Gypsum Company. This option was later exercised and
Western Gypsum heeame a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Certain-Teed. Later, Certain-Teed created a new
eorporation called Bestwall Gypsum Company and
transferred the assets of all of its gypsum facilities to
that corporation, inelmling the stock of "'estern Gyp(Ah. !)()). Subsequently, \V estern Gypsum was
merged into Bestwall which hecame the assignee of the
lease. In 19G5, Bestwall was acquired by and mergetl
with Appellant. This transfer included an assignment
of the lease.
At the time the lease was originally executed, it is
certain that the lessors intended to look only to the
Sigurd plant to satisfy the requirements of the lease.
It was the only plant owned by the lessee, and its con-
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strnction was made part and parcel of the lease agreement. Up until the time
estem Gypsum was merged
into Be'itwall ( l !)JG) (Ex. l 00), the lessee had no ,
other plants which required raw gypsum. At the time of
this merger in l!J5G, llestwall became the lessee, and its
requirements for gypsum greatly exceeded those of the
prior lessees, for Bestwall had nine gypsum plants
scattered in Yarious state. (Ex. 100).
It is a cardinal principle of law that the obligations
under a le:i.se as to requirements do not change upon
an assignment or merger "ith a third party unless all
parties agree upon new and different conditions. This
doctrine is supported by official comment 4 of § 2-806
of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Utah
which states:
"\Yhen an enterprise is sold, the question
may arise whether the buyer is hound by an
existing output or requirements contract ...
Assuming that the contract continues, the output or re<p1irements in the hands of the new
owner continue to be measured by the actual
good faith output or requirements under the
normal operation of the enterprise JJrior to sale.

The sale itself is not
for sudden ex]Jansion or decrease." (Emphasis added)

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
I-I1llL Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77 (3rd
Cir. 1966) held this code provision does not establish
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any new doctri11e, hut simply codifies existing common
)nw priwiples. Thus, as a matter of law, the requirements provision i11 the lease did uot enlarge the obligation of Bestwall e\·en though it hail much greater demand for gypsum than did the original Sigurd plant.
Tlw comluct of the parties leads to the inevitable
conclusion that the lessors did not interpret the lease
to inercase the requirement obligation of any assignee
and partic1ilarly Bcstwall. It was well known that Ilestwall was using gypsum products from other plants and
there is nothing in the trial record which evidences a
clemand by the Trustees that it cease that practice or
respond to them in damages. This in spite of the fact
that Crandall, a Trustee over the years, audited the
books of Bcstwall annually (Ah. 197-98) and had ample
opportunity to raise any objection to
failure
to use Sigurd as its sole source of supply. Neither is
there any eYidcnce in the record that the lessors made
a demand on Georgia-Pacific to cease using gypsum
from other properties after it acquired all of Bestwall's
gypsum plants through merger. Yet, as previously
stated, correspondence and conversations were had between the parties concerning other disputed lease violations.
It is most illuminating to note that the TrusteeRespon<lents asserted this imaginary interpretation of
the lease for the first time when they filed their complaint asking that the court require Appellant to acan<l pay for gypsum used in all of its plants.

(C. 12-1:3). In
filed a 1notion
for partial stmHllary judgment with respect to this
issue and sub111ittcd a memorandum of law on the subjce of requirements contracts and the ohligations of assignees upon assignment. ( C. 3:rn). Suhse<p1ent to the
hearing 011 this motion and hefore any order was entere<l by the trial judge, Hespondents were allowed to
amend their complaint, as<>crting for the first time that
the reqireme1111ts provision of the lease was in fact a
"market requirement" obligation and that there was an
"historic market for the Sigur<l plant". (C. 440). Apparently Hespondents realize<l the ridiculous theory they
ha<l been advocating and narrowed their originally
plcade<l requirements allegation which applied to supplying gypsum to plants all over the United States
and Canada and substituted therefor a geographic market area of the \Vestern Unite<l States. 'Vhile the
amendment narrowed the area, the reduction only prorcd
that the entire concept was the figment of a pleader's
imagination wl1ieh had to be diminished before it could
he swallowed by any juclge. Jn its revised form, it was
favorably considere<l by the trial judge for he imposed
upon Appellant the obligations of producing at an
illusory level at the Sigurd plant and supplying therefrom to customers doing business in a set and greatly
expanded geographic market area. Such a holding
creates by implieation a meeting of the minds of the
parties to a contract on a subject never discussed or con·
sidered arnl one which at hest must be considered as un·
certain, indefinite and imaginary.

in <·onnection with this point, we point out
that Hcspondents should at this late date be estopped to
daim any definite area or quantity of production.
As preYiously discussed, the Appellant was never
informed of the "market requiremellts" interpretation
of the lease 1111til after this action was commenced. (Ab.
5:Z4<-'.W).
r. \Vilson, an official of both Bestwall and
Gcorgia-Pa<'ific, would haYe heen in a position to know
uf such assertions of Hcspornlents had they been made
known. Yet he tcsti fie<l that no such contention was
ever :ulY:rnccd. (Ab. 526). Of the many exhibits produced by Hcspornlents registering complaints against
the Appellant, there are none which assert the market
requirements or minimum productions claims as asserted
by Hesponclrnts at trial and found by the trial court.
Moreover, while Certain-Tee<l and Bestwall were lessees
and for as long as fiye years, between HM:J and 1958,
they exeluded the Southern California market area from
the Sigmd market area ( :E.x. 110, Ah. 570), yet there
was not a single protest. Assginments were made from
a single plant lessee to a multi-plant lessee to a conglomerate lessee and accepfr<l by Uespondents without
any complaint that the yarious lessees were breaching
the requi rernent proYisions of the lease. (Ab. 195).
Some 14 years of silence passed between the time
that Bestwall, the first multi-plant lessee, took an assignment of the lessee's interest, and the time the Respondents first asserted their claim that Appellant must
supply all of the ore requirements of the plants owned

by the lessee, or that it must supply the "market requirements" of the 'Y cstern Fnitcd States. Significantlv if
.'
they had reason to complain about cnntract violation
they shoul(l have made them lrnown to Appellant prior
to its acquisition.

The hooks of the lessees, Certain-Teed. Bestwal!
and Appellant, were audited animally by Hcspo11dents'
accountant-trustee, :\Ir. Crandall and lie was well aware
of their methods of operations. Certainly he luul ample
opportunity to make such claims known to all
lessees if in fact this was the H.espondents' interpretation of the ]ease over the years. It woul<l hare
been difficult if not impossible for I\lr. Crandall
not to have known of the expansion plans of llestwall
with respect to new production to go to the
cstern
market area in light of this close contact . .J uclge Hitter
testified that he and l\Jr. Crandall had had conferences
with Bestwall personi1el over <lisputes on interpretation
of the lease, hut that the 011/y disputes were as to accounting proc<::clnJ'es. (Ab. 1B8). This opportunity to
speak, if Respondents really interpreted the lease in
such manner, aJHl their total failure to make sueh as·
scrtio11s prim· to Appellant's acquisition estop them
from now so asscrti11g.

"r

As stated hy this Court in :.llurrlJ /Jill Mining and
1llilling Co. v. IJm1c11ar, 24 Utah 7:1, 66 P. 7G2 (1901):
"The vital principle of estoppel in pais
is that he who, in his dealings and contracts
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speaks falsely, or is silent when conscience
makes it his duty to reveal the truth, shall not
he pennitte1l to speak the truth when conscience
requires him to he silent; that he who, by his
language or conduct, leads another to believe
that certain facts exist, and the other is induced thereby to make expenditures, incur
liabilities, or to do what he otherwise would
not have clone, .shall not, to the injury of the
other, he permitted to <lispute those facts, or
by the enforcement of an adverse claim, based
upon different facts, disappoint the expectations which his language or conduct inspire. No
one is permitted by his language, silence, or
conduct to mislead another to his injury." (p.

7D)

It must he t'o11d11ded from all of tlie evidence on
the record that there was total silence from the inception
of the lease to the filing of the complaint and amended
complaint rcspecfo·ely hy Respondents as to any obligation to supply all of Bestwall's or Georgia-Pacific's
gypsum plants from ore of the demised premises or
any "market requirements" interpretation of the lease.
Had such an interpretation been asserted by Respondents, it is obvious that Geoq.ria-Pacific would not
have acquired the Bestwall interests, and thus preclude
itself from competing effectively in the W estem gypsum products market. Respondents' silence with respect
to its present interpretation of the lease and the Ap-
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pella11t's relia11cc on that silence estops the Hespon<lents
from asscrtiI1g sueh claim. and the trial court erre<l in
not so findi11g.

POIXT II
.i\SSlT'.\11:\C,

TIIAT

TIIEHE AHE L\IPLIED COVEN.i\XTS
AS TO TIIE
PHOVISIOX OF TIIE LE ASE, THE
THir\L COUHT EHHED IN ITS FINDOF F.,\CT 8 _AXD lG AXU IN ITS
F1\I LUHE TO ADOPT THE THEORY
ST_.:\TEU IN APPELLAN'l"S FINDING OF F.,\CT Y (Ii).
This point raises the e1Tor committed hy the trial
judge in findi11g that there was a set and specific
"historie marketing area of the Sigurd pla11t'' and there·
fore the i11fusion of production from Appellant's Lorell
and Aeme plants violated the implied covenants to maintain a specific market area as found by the trial judge
i11 its Finding· No. '27. This error seems so e,·ident that
it should require little
hut out of an abundance of caution we will point out the obvious. As a start·
ing proposition, we point out that there is not a trace
of evidence in the entire record whieh would support
the trial court's Finding of Fact Ko. 8. This finding is
to the effect that the historic marketing area of the
Sigurd plant from its beginning until late in the year
1 !W7 included the States of 'Vashington, Oregon, California, Utah, Nevada, Idaho and the Western part of

Colorado, J\I 011tana and \Vyoming. Neither is there
any testirnony to support Finding of Fact No. 27 to the
same effect. \\'hilc the trial court cites as its basis for
support of Finding of Fact No. 27 plaintiff's Exhibit
1, we read it to the contrary. In that connection, counsel
for 1\ ppdla11t has the termerity to suggest that that
exhibit
repudiates the finding of an inviolate
"historic Sigurd market area". \Ve interpret that exhibit
to show that in rnna, Bestwall's Acme, Texas plant, as
well as the Sig11rcl plant, was supplying the Southern
California area. Certainly at that time that territory
was shared with a second plant. Exhibit 110, a marketing map of the Bestwall Gypsum Company, shows that
in 1!).)8 the ( Tnion Gypsum plant in Phoenix, Arizona,
supplied Bcstwall's market requirement in all of Arizona
aiul Southern California as far north as San Francisco. Exhibit l 11 shows that in l 960, these market areas
had changed so that the Sigurd plant was supplying
all of Arizona, California . .N eva<la, Oregon, \Vashington ancl Idaho awl parts of Colorado, \\Tyoming and
l\Ionta1ia. Exhibit 158 shows that at the time litigation
was cornrncnccd in this case, the Acme, Texas plant was
se1Ti11g So11 lhcrn California and Arizona and that the
Lo\'eil, \Vyoming plant was serving most of \\ryoming,
all of ::\fontana, Northern Idaho, Northern Oregon and
all of 'Vashington.
l\Ir. Eugene Burch, presently sales manager for
the. Appellant's gypsum division and formerly a salesman for Bestwall in the San Francisco territory, testified that in 1956, the territory south of San Francisco

suppliecl hy the Union
Cornpa11y's plant
in Phoenix, .Arizona, with Sigmd slii pping into the
Xorthern California area. (Ah. ;)fi!)). Mr. Clcrm Wilson. presently \'il'{'-Presidc11t in clwrge of the 1\ppella11t's gn>sum di,·isio11 and a forJller employee of Bestwall, testi ficd that in 1!l;)H nnd years prior thereto the
Cnion (;ypsum Company plant supplied Bestwal!'s
market requirements for the Southern California area
( l\h. 1:!1-:!:!) and that the Union
Company
plant went into production in rn5B. (.Ah. 11H). Ile
ksti i'icrl that a market area cannot be fixed with any
hope that it wi11 endure. According to him. a market
area is cst:Lh]ished on the basis of combinations of costs
of production at a gi\·cn plant, the freight rates from a
plant into a particular area, and co111petitiYe conditions
in the 111arkeL place. (Ah. 1:w-:n). 'Ve firnl that there
is no eYidencc 011 the rc<'onl contrary to the trstimony
of .:\Ir. \\Tilson and
r. Bmch set out ahcwe arnl their
qualii'i<'ations arc not suspect.

;\11y fair reading of the record woul1l impress the
reader with the fact that the Sigurd rnarket area eon·
tinuousl:•' changed and did not become historically
fixed; and, that market arcr.s by their Ycry 11ature vary
in rclatim1 to costs of produdinn, transportation and
serYice und the prices in the market place. That is the
history of Sigurd. Thus, the concl11sion is ineYitahle that
the trial court erred in its finding that there was a his·
torical Sigurd rnarki:t area. "Then that finding fails,
the conclusion by the trial judge that Appellant, having

paid 11 0 ll('e<l to that fixed area Yiolate<l implied coveDants in the lease, must he reversed.
ing one step further. we point out that if the
i\ppella11t were to perform in the manner determined
hr the trial comt, it would do so in contradiction of the
tn111s of the lease agreement. \Ve restate the
pri11eiple that no covenants, terms or obligations may be
i111 plied in a contract which are inconsistent with the
express tern is of the agreement. 17 Am J ur 2d Contracts§ 255 at !i.31 ( HW4) see 1Valtcr R. Cliffe Co. 71•
D111'011t
Co., 298 F. 649, 651 (D. Di-\
;Vmire L ,1 nwld, 114 Utah 46:3, 701 P.2d 47.)
( ;0

( HJ-J.!)).

Paragraph 2(E) (C. 24) of the ]ease agreement
requires that the lessee eo1Hluct the business in a prudent
and businesslike 11w1111er for all interests concerned. llad
the Sigurd plant increased its production to ship gypsum
wallboard to the Southern California market during the
years l!Hi8- ]!)iO, the llllCOlltradictcd e\·iclence is that
all sueh sa Jes wou Id ha ,-e been made at a loss of from
*a.oo to $8.00 per S.)f. 2 / (Ab. •326-27). Had the Appellant 11ot :wquired the newly constructed Lovell,
Wyoming plant, the evidence is conclusive that this
plant would ha\'e been acquired by a competitor who
wo11l<l lun·c mm·e<l its pro<luct into the Salt Lake City
area and other parts of the Intermountain 'Vest in direct competition with the Sigurd plant. (Ab. 469).

-----

letters 'S.i\l ." as used herein and in the various exhibits
the record means 1000 square feet of gypsum wallboard,
surface rnP.asure.
in

i\Iost assuredly. inneasing production for the pm.
prose of sclJing sueh prod11ctio11 at a loss is neither
prudent nor h11si11esslike. Protecting a market area
close to a product plant when freight costs are a significant factor is hoth prudent and businesslike for the
interests of hoth the lessor and the lessee, especially
when the A ppcllant admittedly increased its relatire
market share in the western market to allow for such
acquisition. (Ah. I 00, Ex. 159).
Dr. Hosse, an expert economist, testified as to the
relati,·e business practice of the Appellant and its competitors. 'Ve quote his testimony:
"Georgia-Pacific in spite of the adversity
that the industry has faced has managed to
keep its plants busier than most, has managed
to increase its market share and at the same
time has shown, at least as good a profit picture as the industry on the average is showing.
That is, it woulcl seem to me that the evidence
that I see in the market place suggests that
Georgia-Pacific is in fact exercising goo<l
business judgment." (Ab. 643).
Had the Appellant complied with the artificial
covenants imposed by the trial judge as set forth in his
Findings of Fact 27, and 32 and Conclusion of Law
No. 2, it would have breached its express obligation of
conducting the business in a prudent and businesslike
manner. :Moreover, it would have opeated at a substan·
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tial loss to both the Appellant and Respondents and so
it is most <lifficult to follow the concepts announced by
the trial judge. It follows that the court erred in its
Conclusion of J ,aw No. 2 holding that the Appellant had
breached its duties under the lease.

POINT III
TIIE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING TILE TESTll\IONY AS TO
AS OFFERED BY THE
RESPONDENTS' E X P E R T ACCOUXTANT AND ACCEPTING IT AS
EYIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
A\VAHD OF DAMAGES AND DECLAHATORY UELIEF.
Mr. Grant Caldwell was the only witness called

by plaintiffs to establish damages resulting from the

alleged breaeh of the lease agreement by GeorgiaPacific. Exhibits 139-141 were prepared by him and
they are founcl by the trial court to be a proper method
of determining the profit royalty under the lease, both
as to the years in dispute and in the future. (Findings
of Fact 28, :32) . As we hope to point out, these Findings were erroneous for two reasons: (I) the lack of
necessary qualification of the witness to state an opinion
as an expert in the marketing and economic fields, and
(2) the unsupported and false foundations used by
him to support his conclusions. One of the cardinal rules
in the testimonial qualifications field is that the required
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qualifications hy a partienlnr person offerc<l as a wit11ess he expressly shown by the party offering him.
Here that rule w:is 110t honored by its observance.
In attempting to pron· the qualifieations of Mr.
Caldwell to testify as an expert witness, plaintiffs intr0<luced C\'idence that he was qualified in the fiPld of
acemmting. (Ah. :!7.3). II ow::vcr, of importance to this
issue is the failure of Hcspondents to prod11ee any eYidcnee at all shmYi11g that he was qualified to testify as
an expert in the fields of ec(Jnomics or market analysis.
Furthermore, the only evidence of record on this subject demo:1strates the contrary. (Ah. 3GI-GG).
In addition. the re<"ord .shows that )Ir. Caldwell, in
determining the umount of damages suffered hy plaintiffs. made u11fo111l(letl assumptions which were beyond
the realm and capacity of an accountant and which
were not snpportc<l by the facts in the record.
Dunean, a qnalifie<l accounting expert called by defendants, testified that each of these assumptions were
improperly drawn under standards which apply to the
field of accounting. (Ab. 711). l\I r. Caldwell admitted
as fo1lows with respect to this subject:

"Q.

you <lon't know that and you haven't

made that stwly as an economist or as a
market analyst?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

And you are not an economist and you
are not a market analyst?
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A.

No, sir. I am not a market analyst.

Q.

And you are not an economist?

A.

I am not a professional economist.

Q.

Aml you haYen't ma<le any particular
studies of the economy of the gypsum industry as it relates to these projections
other than the books arnl records (of
(jf.'orgia-Pacific) which you have descrihe<l herein?

Q.

So for example you can't tell us at any
giYen point of time what the competitors
of
were doing in the market place?

A.

.No sir.

Q.

A IHI you can't tell us of any particular
time what the customers of GeorgiaPaci fie were doing or demanding in the
market place?

A.

Only as it relates to the price which was
being charged the customers." (Ah. 364-

* * *

(i;) ) •

l\Ir. Caldwell's method of determining damages
Was to compare the lease payments made to the Trust
prior to a111l after the acquisition of the Sigurd plant
hy Georgia-Pacific, i.e., an "historical" approach, and
by attempting to "estimate" that the economic loss was
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caused
the acquisition of the Lm-ell plant and an
expansion of the .Acme plant.
In making the cale11latio11s shown in Exhibits 1:rn.
141, l\lr. Caldwcl1 made Yarious assumptions of fact
totally at Yariance with the only evidence admitted at
the trial. They were premised 011 unsound economic and
marketing principles and they establish the witness's
total Jack of expertise or knowledge requisite to testifying as an expert on damages. 1 n recei,·ing these exhibits and giving them credence, the trial court erred
as a matter of law. The judge aggrarnted the error hy
denying a motion to strike the exhibits after the evidence was all in and there were no facts to support the
assumptions or to show the witness's qualifications as
an expert to testify about such subjects. (Ab. 303-05,
308-0U).

"\Ve heJie\'e it necessary to fu Uy de,·elop only
two of several assumptions made hy l\Ir. Caldwell,
which are contradicte1l hy lioth the evidence on the record
an<l the most elementary economic principles. These are:
( 1) The assumption that the price decline in the
"\Vestern market was caused solely by Appellant in its
operation of the Lovell and _Acme plants, and

( 2) The assumption that the Sigurd plant should
have experienced profit levels in 1965-1970 equal to
the profit levels of 1962-1964.
'l'he first erroneous assumption made by l\Ir. Caldwell may he a<l<luced from a consideration of Exhibit
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HJ. In that document, he attempts to calculate the
"estilllatcd" sales price decline of gypsum products durirw
the •years l!Hi8, l!lG9 and rn70 as com1mred to 1967
/"'>
br using the average price declines of all of GeorgiaPaci t'ic's plants east of the Continental Divide. l\Ir.
Caldwell testified that the reason he used this "estimate<l" price decline rather than the actual price decline experienced in. the \ Vestern market area was because of the additional production of the Lovell and
Acme plants which was infused into the \Vestern market area. Ile concludes in the ahsence of evidence that
this production was the <lominent cause of the actual
price decline experience<l in this area. (Ab. 309-14).

According to the witness, the price decline in the
'Vestern market area was greater than that experienced
in the remainder of the United States, and, therefore,
the in fusion breached the terms of the lease and the
Uespondcnts were damagecl to the extent of the decline
caused by such action. l\Ir. Caldwell testified, and the
trial ocurt found, that while there might be other factors
contributing to the price decline, the infusion would
certainly he the dorninent factor in creating that situation. (Ah. 314, Finding of Fact, 26).
However, hy his calculations used in Exhibit 141,
l\Ir. Caldwell attributes Georgia-Pacific's action as the

only factor of the precipitous price decline in the West.
Again the record is barren of any evidence to support
this assumption. On the contrary, there is extensive evidence given by qualified experts in the fields of eco-
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nom1cs and market
that this assu111ptio11 was
false. Dr. Hosse. previously idmtified as a highly qualified economist, made an exha11sti\·e stwly of the gypsum
in:lustry in the \ Vcstern market area prior to his inn1lve111cnt in this case. I le festifiecl that there were two
major factors which caused the precipitous price decline
of gypsum prmluets in the \Vest. These were the earlier
and more pronounced decline in housing starts in this
area as compared to other parts of the United States,
thus dcercasi11g gypsum hoard demand (Ah. 66), and
the inereasecl production of all gypsum wallboard manufacturers in the \Vest, thus greatly increasing supply.
( ,\ h. G:JO-H 1) .
The analyses of both Dr. Rosse awl Dr. Grether,
another expert in marketing, as to the differences in
gypsum cle111arnl in the \Vest as compared to the remainder of the Fnitecl States is home out hy statistical e\·iclenee admitted hy the trial <.:omt. (Ab. 8%) (Appendix A to Brief). The I BG8 Statistical A hstrad of the
United States as prepared
the U.S. Department of
Commerce corrohorates their testimony ns it shows that
there
an earlier and greater cleeJinc in housing
starts in the \\T estern LT11ited States than for the F.S.
as a whole. It further shows tliat the decline commenced
as to the Pacific and l\Iountain States in 19fi4, while
housing starts in suhstantially all other areas of the
United States were still increasing; that by Hl60 new
housing starts in the Paeific and .:\fountain States were
only 4:t% (
as compared to 427,5!)0) of those
in I U63; that housing starts in the State of California
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in I !)H(i were only !l3 % ( !)!),083 compared to 305,524)
of lio11si11g starts in l!)():J; and, that the remainder
of the ( T11itc<l States, excluding the Pacific states area,
had housing starts in rnGG equirnlent to 8!l% of 19G3.
From the l!l70 Statistical Abstract (Ex. 188), it can
he s<'ell that hy rntrn the United States as a whole had
housing starts equal to that experienced in 1963, but
that the Pacific states area was still 18% below the 1963
level.

In addition to the facts as presented at trial which
prove<l these assumptions false, we invite the court's
attention to the case of 11 ·all Products Co. v. National
G.i1ps11111 Co., ct al, 32G F. Su11p. 2!)5 (.N.D. Calif.
l!lil), an antitmst case dealing with the same period of
ti111c as is at issue in the case at hand, the same industry
ancl the sa111c market area. The court therein gave a detailed narrati,·e of the economics of the gypsum industry
in its findings, idcntil'al to that introduced by Appella11t's <'xpert witnesses, Drs. Rosse and Grether; and
Messrs. "' ilson, l\IcCaskill and Burch. ''Tith respect to
this demand aspect of the cause of the price decline,
totally ignored by l\fr. C'alclwell as a relevant factor; the
court specifically pointed out:
"In the period rnG4-65 the rate of growth
in demand for gypsum wallboard began to decline. The principal muses for this decline
were the increased satisfaction of the post-war
demand for new housing and the lessening of
growth in demand attributable to substitution
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of' gyp:mm hoard for other wall coverings .
The lleclinc i11 demand hegan earlier and was
more 'iewre in California than in the United
States generally." ( p. :303)
l\'hilc l\f r. Caldwell ignored this problem of declining demand and its ('ontrihntion to the declining
priees of gypsum products in the \Vest, this was not
the only hiatus in his ratimializatio11. l\Iost significantly, he failed to consider that in supplying gypsum products in the area. Georgia-Pacific was a relatively small
contributor which the evidence showefl was in the range
of not more than 10%-12%. (Ah. 6i30). Furthermore,
when the siltwtio11 bettered and Ge<'rgia-Paeif'ic inerease<l its production for the \Vestem market. its competitors clicl likewise.

In support of (jeorgia-Pacific's side of the con·
trovcrsy and of considerable importance to this issue
are these fads which were given no weight
l\I r. Caldwell. In the early }!)()O's all gypsum manufacturers be·
gan to plan for Ilf:W plants and increased capacity in olcl
ones to meet what they thought woulcl he a building
hoom in the \Vestern United States. During this period
National (;ypsnm Company, the seconcl largest gypsum
producer in the country, entered the \Vest Coast market
hy building plants in X orthem and Southern California;
the Bighorn Gypsum Company (now celote:x) built a
plant at Cody, \Vyoming; Pahco built a plant in Florence, Colorado; Republic Gypsum Company erected a
plant in Duke, Oklahoma; Kaiser Gypsum Company
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and American Gypsum Company huilt plants in the
Albuquerque, N cw 1\lexico area; Pabco built a plant in
Apex, N" ernda; the Flintkote Company built a plant in
the San Francisco Bay area. (Ab. 433-35, 629-63).
Thus, hy the mid-HHIO's, the market area west of the

Continental J)ivide was served by 21 plants where formerly there had been only 12 or 13.
Even though contrary to 1\lr. Caldwell's testimony,
it should he obvious to this Court that greatly increasing production in the \Vestern area and scatterinr'plants near the centers of population where freight rates
are lower will result in keener competition and lower
prices to the purchasers. The only real experts in economics and marketing followed the obvious and expressed disagreement with l\Ir. Caldwell's assumption
Ly stating that you cannot disregard 90% of the suppliers in determining what caused the decline in prices.
(Ab. G87-88) . It seems a hsurd, but it is nevertheless
the fact, that l\lr. Caldwell ignored the addition of substantial new or expanded production facilities in the
Westem market area by stating that the infusion of
the Lovell and Acme production was the "dominant"
factor of the price decline. (Ab. 314). And this without knowledge of any of the other factors influencing
prices. Significantly, the court in Wall Products, supra,
confirmed the testimony of Georgia-Pacific's experts
on the addition to the total capacity of other producers
in the area by stating:
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"The de fr11da11ts U.S. Gypsum, 1' ational,
Kaiser and Fiberboard, together with Flintkote, added l ,287 l\ll\l SF of capacity during
the 2 year perio(l of HW5 and l!)GG, ru·co1111ti11« for 85 percent of the total capacity added
by the industry during those years." (Emphasis added)
This would seem to render )1 r. Caldwell's testimony
worthless and yet based upou his u11supportcd and un·
founded assumption, the Re.-;pondents contended and
the trial court found. with slight modification, that
I (j 111orc mis due for the years l fHi8- l fl70 than if
actual price (leelines were used as the base for computatioa. The method of arriving at the above stated
figure is set fmth in Appendix "B" for the cmwe11ience
of the Court.

Xo reasons were given by l\Ir. Caldwell to suhstan·

tiate the second assumption, i.e., that the Sigurd plant
should ha Ye experienced profit lcYels in JUG5- 1!)70 equal
to the prnfit lcYcls of HW2-l!)G4, exeept that the historical level of profits (I 9G2-1 DG4) should be the basis for
present prufits. (Ah. !>21) . The base for that assump·
tion is eaten away hy the testimony of Dr. Rosse, Mr.
'Yilson and l\Ir. l\IcCaskill. These experts in the field
of marketing testified that the HlG2-HlG4 period was
the peak period for the gypsum industry (Ab. <i33),
tlie "cream years" when manufacturers could pick and
choose their customers, demand high prices, and f eW
costs were incurred to service the customer. (Ab. 431·
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.'H. ;)-l·li-48. 017-21) ..All shipments were on a full car-

load lot has is. (Ah. 537). These same witnesses testified that the years of 1965-1970 used by l\lr. Caldwell

for comparison were years of economic depression for
the gnJsum industry, requiring not only the lowering
of prices due to decrease in demand but also major increases in cost to service the customer to obtain the business and sell the product competitively. (Ab. 450-54,
53!)) .

To ascertain how ridiculous the comparison is, the

Court 11eccl only read 1Vall Prod1icls Co.

N.

National

Gy11s11111 Co., 326 F.Supp. 2!J5 (N.D. Cal. 1971} to
com pa re these same periods ( 1962-l!J64 to 1965-1970)
with respect to the profit levels of three of GeorgiaPacific's competitors. These facts are related in that
opm10n:
"Kaiser's net profit, hefore taxes, as a
pereentage of fixed assets applicable to gypsum products for 1960 was 3.1 percent. This
rate rose steadily to a peak of 10.4 percent for
lflG:J, declined to 4.2 percent for Hl64 and
thereafter for each of the years l!J6.5 through
HHi8 Kaiser experienced losses which for 1967
rcaehed a loss of 4.7 percent of its fixed
assets applicable to gypsum products.
"Fibreboard's Gypsum Division sustained
a net loss for 1960 of $582,000 and eamed a
net profit for 1961 of $216,000. Fibreboard's

Cyps11m Division's net profits i11crcasc(l steadthereafter to a peak of approxi111atcly *1.l
million for 1 !Hi:J and then cleclinc<l for 1 !Hit to
approximate)\·
For each of the .years
.
l!Hi5 through HHi8 Fihreho:ml's Gypsum
DiYision sustained losses reaching approximately :f;l.2 million for the year HHiG.
"Fli11tkol1,'s gypsum diYision's net profits
for 1 !HiO were approximately :f;2 million. These
profits rose to peak of about $2.4 million for
and thc11 <lcc1i11ed steeply to ]osses of
more tlw.n *1 million for each of the years rnG5
awl HlCH. Thereafter these cli,·isions earned
small profits of about *U0,000 for 19G7 and
1 !l68."
That the foreg1)ing comparison i.-; appropriate, may
be gleaned from the evidence of I )r. Hosse. IJ e testif icd, gypsum prod net<> are ho111ogc11eous, arnl as one

lll:llluf'adurer goes with respect to profits, so substan·
do the rest. (Ah. (i J;)) . This won Id mean that
generally all members of the i1Hl11stry would lose or
make 111011ey during the same periods. Yet the court
fouml tliat while its competitors '"ere suffering losses
from 1!)()5- Hl70, Georgia-Pacific's Sigurd plant should
have had profits duri11g this period equal to those
periods when all gypsum manufacturers had all time
high profits. It is also pertinent to note that the depres·
sion in the whole industry in the latter period admittedly
was so severe that numerous plants situated closer to

the may>r markC't areas than was Sigurd were forced
hy seYere losses to close down their operations competely and to go out of husiness. (Ab. 440-41, Ex. 1.57).
This fact was pointed out to the Court by witnesses
Wilson. l\IcCaskill, Grether and Hosse to demonstrate
that it took superior efforts by Georgia-Pacific and
the exercise of the most prudent business judgment to
keep Sigunl in operation at all during this depressed
perio<l. (Ah. (ia;3, G40). In addition, this conclusion was
reached by Mr. Caldwell in spite of the fact that he
a<lmitted his lack of knowledge of what was
in the market place as to these products during those
years, that he had made no marketing studies, that he
was not a marketing analyst or an economist, and had
used only the hooks and records of Georgia-Pacific in
making his 1letermination. (Ab. 361-66).
Base<l upon the improper assumption that the
profits of
in 1965-1970 should have
hem the same as those experienced in 1962-1964, :Mr.
Caldwell calculated the profit for each 1000 square feet
of gypsum hoanl (SM) manufactured at Sigurd during those years, arri,·ing at a profit of $.9025 per Sl\L
(Ex. UO). l\Ir. Caldwell then used this 90¢ figure to
calculate damages for the years 1965, 1966 and 1967,
and modified this figure for the years 1968, 1969 and
Hl70 to reflect the subsequently discussed erroneous
assumption that the price decline in the Western market resulted solely from Georgia-Pacific's infusion of
Lovell an<l Acme production. (Ex. 139) •
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hen there is no evidence to factually support ern-

nornie assumptions made hy an assmne1l expert; when
he displays a total lack of knowledge of economic cause
and effect relationships; and. when his qualifications to
testify on the particubr suhjeet are not established by
his spo!lsor, the courts haYP not hesitated to exclu<le
such testimony when the party proffering such fails to
meet any one of the above criteria.

,no

In Ja11g11la t'. U.S. R/Jbbcr Co., 147 Mont. 98,
P .:!d 4Ht ( l!IHG), the l\I ontana Supreme Court held

as error the admission of
expert testimony not
supported hy facts in evidence. The court stated:
"The rules relating to testimolly of an
expeli witness ha,·e been set forth in Irion v.
Hyde, UO Moat. ;370, 105 P.2<1 <inti. The
expert must first testify to the facts within
his own knowledge or based upon his own oh. serrntion upon which his opinion is based. He
must haYc the training and expcrienC'c to draw
a correct inference from facts outside the
range of ordinary human experience. The
judgmellt of an expert will not support the
verdict when opposed hy undisputed facts and
the dictates of common sense. '\There, as here,
the conclusions of the experts are based on
facts which do not exist, or are the result of
an infercnce, admission over objection is erroneous. "
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In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 39
F.Supp. \1;)7 ( E.D. Ky. lU41), the court was called upon
to determine the admissibility of the testimony of an
expert shtistician as to kinds of tobacco in terms of
Government grades. The court stated:

"\Vhile the courts will give wide latitude
to the reception of expert opinion evidence, we
think it axio1rnttic that it must he based upon
concedecl or proven facts, and that a naked
opion, basccl obviously on mere speculation and
conjecture, does not rise to the dignity of eviclc11ce, especially when it is in conflict with the
concede< 1 physical facts ... "
'fhe fact that l\lr. Caldwell was qualified to testify
as an accountant did not qualify him to testify as to
economic cause and effect. As stated by this Court in
Starlin 11• Madsen, 120 Utah 6131, 2:J7 P.2cl 834 ( 1951):
".Just who is arnl is not an expert, and the
requisites and qualifications thereon are matters which are relative to the facts on the
particular case, mul the subject upon which the
11css is called to give tcstimon!J." (Citing II
\Vig-more on Evidence 3rd Ed. Sec. 555).
(Emphasis added).

As stated by 'Vigmore:
"There is that class of matters as to which
it is only by means of special and peculiar ex-
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perie11ce, more than is the common position,
that a person hecomcs eornpetc11t to accp1ire
knowledge. Hence, the possession of this canuot hr as.rn med, e\'Cl1 for an individual witness,
but 11111st be
shown beforehand."
(Emphasis added) (I I \Vigmore on Evidence,
:.Jnl Ed. Sec. 5.5G, p. ();J5) .
This Court has, through its Rule of Evidence, 19,
effective ,July 1, rn71, adopted the ahoYe cited common
law pri1wiples:
"As a prerequisite for the testimony of a
witness on a rden111t or material matter, there
must be cv idcnce that he has personal knowledge thereof, or ex pericnce, training or edueation if such he required ... the judge may receiYe conditionall.v the testimony of the witness as to a relenmt or material matter, subject
to the evidence of lrnowledge, experience,
training or education being Jater supplied in the
course of the trial."
The facts of record as applied to the almYe cited
cases and rules of evidence demonstrate that the trial
court erred in admitting into evidence the testimony of
l\Ir. Caldwell and Exhibits 13B-141 as prepared hy him .
.J\ cccrdingly, on this ground alone, the judgment should
be reYersed.
l\Ir. Caldwell also made the following additional
"assumptions" which are makeweights to shore up his
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C'onclusions. I 11 like manner to those hereinahove disCllSSc<l

arc u11s11 pportahle hy any evidence of
record. A11<l again, importantly they are contrary to
the 11nco11trovcrted facts found therein.
These assumptions are as follows:

That the production of Appellant's Acme
and Lovell plants supplied to the 'Vest Coast could
ha1e been supplied, to the extent of Sigurd's capacity,
at a profit to 1he Sigmd plant arnl at the same profit
lerel as i11 the years l!)G2, 1963 and 1964. ( Exs. 189,
( 1)

uo).

That during the years 1!)67-1968 the Sigurd
plant could have produced at 97% of the capacity which
was the <'apacily achieved hy that plant in 1967 and at
the same profit level as was reached in the years 1962,
HJH3 awl ]!)G.J.. (.Ex. l:l9, 140).
( 2)

to the first of the above quoted assumptions, its
base for support was destroyed by l\Ir. Caldwell's admissions that he liacl made no market survey to determine
if Sigurd could have sold additional gypsum board in
any particular market at any particular profit. And asSllllling, hut without deciding, that his testimony might
hare heen admissible it was levelled to the unbelievable
state when the experts working in that particular field
de\'eloped the true situation. l\Ir. 'Vilson, Appellant's
Gypsum Division Vice President, testified that if
Sigurd had shipped products to Southern California,
during the years being considered, it would have done
i\S
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so at a loss hctween *!J.00 a111l $8.00 per Sl\1. (Ah. 526),
Acconlingly, in disposing of the secornl assumption we
mention that the trial judge modified the supposition
in that his findings of fact were ha.-;ed on the average
capacities for the years HW;3, 1!1GG and HW7. However,
neither the basic assumption as expressed hy Mr. Calcl.
wcJl nor the one usc1l by the trial judge ha,·c any basis
in fact and are contrary to the evidence found in the
record. Certainly as we interpret the evidence it is over·
whelming in favor of the proposition that increasing
production i1.t Sigurd would only have created a greater
loss to the plant during the yea rs in question.
In addition to money damages awarded Respon<l·
ents hy the trial court, it also awarded declaratory relief
based upon J\l r. Cal<lwcll's assumptions to the effect
that all future
payments be based upon the
"historical" meth01l of determining the profit royalty
in accmdance with Exhibits 130-141 as mo<lifie<l hy the
Findings and Conelusions.
The judgment rendered by the trial court modified
)fr. Caldwell's assumption set forth in Exhihit 13fl that
.Appcllunt's Sig1ml plant shoul<l produce at the mm
le\'el of produl'tiou. The judgment obligates Appel·
lants to produce at the aYerage of the years 1!lG5, 1966,
1 !Hi7 ( 1
square feet) so long as ore is available
and it has a sufficient market in the "historic market
area". As with the calculation of damages heretofore
discussed, the calculation of future royalty payments
as required hy the trial court are based upon the same
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unfounded assumptions that make the damages unwarrantPd. J1:,·en as modified by the trial court, there is no
foundation in fact or law for such an obligation to be
placed on A ppcllant. \Ve have previously demonstrated
in Point l I that there is no such thing as a historic market area, and on that basis alone the trial court's judgment is unfounded. Further, however, this ruling, interpreting the "requirements" provision of the lease,
places that pro\'isim1 beyond the realm of business realitv awl squarely in conflict with other provisions of
the lease. Under this ruling, Appellant is obligated to
procluce at the given capacity even though every fou'
of gypsum board produced is sold at a loss. And even
though it is sold at a loss, and the Sigurd plant shows a
loss, Appellant is obligated to pay to Respondents a
profit royalty equal to peak year profits ( 1962-1964).
Selling gypsum at a loss and paying a "profit" royalty
is wholly inconsistent. Also, paragraph 2 ( E) of the
lease obligates the Appellant to carry on the business
in a "prudent and businesslike manner for all interests
concerned". To produce at a given level of production
despite the fact that production is sold at a loss is neither
prudent nor businesslike for either party.

For the above reasons, Appellant asks that the
Court set aside both the damages and the declaratory
relief granted to Respondents by the trial court.

--(i{)

POIXT IY
TIIE THI.AL COURT EHRED IN
FI:\'DIXC- THAT TlIE APPELLAXT
HAD UEP ,,\ HTED FHOl\l ACCOUN'fIXG
OF T H E
LEASE AND FHOl\l THE ACCOUNTIXU PRACTICES DEVELOPED AND
AGHEED UPOX BY PHIOR LESSEES.
This point will be argued in two separate parts.
The first is that the trial court erred in finding that the
Appellants had departed from the "10%" Letter Agree·
nwnt. (Ex. 113) .
Jn rn:rn, prior to the acquisition of Bestwall by
Georgia-Pacific. Bestwall and the IPssors entered into
a letter agreement for the purpose of simplifying the
accounting of the profit royalty with respect to the ex·
penses of gc·neral administration, selling and adrer·
tising ( GS&A). This was brought about hy the fact
that cost alloeations from three different eorporations,
Certain-Tt:'cd, Bestwall and Hestwall-Certai11-Teed
Sales Corporation, wou1ll have been required to de·
termine the actual cost of the items (Ex. I la). In order
to amid the difficulties and administration prohlems
being encountered at that time a letter agreement was
executed. In that agreement, it was stated that GS&A
expenses would he set at 10% of the "cost of sales" (cost
of manufacture plus materials).
l\Iajor operational changes as to marketing the
gypsum products produced at Sigurd to meet competi-
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tion heeamc necessary when Georgia-Pacific became
lessee. It eliminated the middleman-wholesaler, using
its own strategically located distribution centers already
in existence at the time of the acquisition. (Ab. 537-38).
Because of this change, the lessee was, for the first
time, performing services such as unloading carload
lots, warehousing, loading gypsum onto trucks and deliYering truck loads direct to customers. (Ab. 536-41).
These aids to marketing were never before performed
hy the lessee. Prior to that time, all distribution costs
of the lessee stopped when the full rail car had reached
its destination. (Ab. 537). Under this earlier procedure,
the Sigurd plant had sold to the wholesaler at list price
less !l.8%, the 9.8% margin being the amount required
by the wholesaler to perform the warehousing and secondary shipping functions and hopefully make a profit.
(Ab. 167, 454, 600).

The district court refused to allow Georgia-Pacific
to claim any of the costs found necessary to operate
under this advanced system and held that, under the
lease as modified by the "10%" letter agreement, it was
required to use the ultimate sales price received by the
center in computing the profit royalty, and
use only the 10% of costs of goods sales formula in
acco1111ti11g for all of the costs incurred at the distribution center to which the Sigurd plant's gypsum products
are shipped as well as general administrative, advertising and selling expenses (GS&A) not incurred at the
distribution centers. In support of its holding the district
court found that:
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"All expemes below the gross profit line
at the Sigurd operation, including all selling,
advertising awl general administrative expenses, were set permanently at 10% of cost
of sales." (Firnli11g of Fact No. 23)
and
"The dic;trihution centers perform only an
advertising and se1ling function. They act as
a sales vehicle ... Such 'selling expenses' of
the Uistrihutio11 Centers are plainly included
within the agree1l 10% formula for all items
below the gross profit line which items include
au selling, advertising arnl administrative expenses." (Finding of Fact No. 24)
The trial court erred as to these findings, hoth as
to the interpretation of the Jetter agreement and the
nature of the functions performed at the distribution
centers. In rrnching the fouling the district court dis·
regarded importnnt parts of the letter agreement set·
ting forth the 10% formula ancl thus erred in its ap·
plication. In that connection, we invite the Comt's at·
tention to the wording of this document. 1Vhile the
fourth paragraph of the first page of this agreement
states "all items below the gross profit", this is express·
ly amplified and modified by the third paragraph of
the second page of the letter which provides:
"The suggested 10% figure covers the
charge for selling, advertising, and administra·
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expense and a credit for purchase dis<:m111ts. It docs not include an.11 other items of
'other income, or 'other deductions' as it is our
thought that these are non-recurring in nature,
could not be contemplated by any formula, and
ha\·e had no significant net effect on past computations." (Emphasis added).
Certainly, at the time the letter was executed, a
complete change of marketing system some years later
as intr()(lueecl hy Georgia-Pacific to meet competitive
pressures "could not be contemplated" by any formula,
and therefore the expenses at the distribution centers
could not he included in the 10% formula unless they
were in fact only sales expenses. The evidence found
in the trial record demonstrates conclusiYely that all
of the functions at the distribution centers were not
selling expenses.
Dr. Rosse testified that the activity at the distribution eenters as he had personally observed them were
something other than, and indeed quite different from,
selling activities. (Ab. 641). It serves an inventory
function and combines gypsum products with other
products to effectuate freight savings. He verbalized
as follows:
"I woul<l characterize it as an important inventory distribution function ..." (Ab. 642) .
. Mr. Thomas, Sacramento Distribution Center
Manager, explained the function of the distribution
center as to gypsum products shipped from Sigurd:
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"The gypsum products arrive from Sigunl by rail. They are unloaded, stored and at
that point hopefully sold and then delivered."
(Ali. 8H;'l)
As to acl'ounting allocations in performing these func·
tions, he testified:
"The moYemcnt from the rai]roacl car into
the shed and the moyemcnt around the premises where we store it is a material handling
expense. The obvious movement of our trucks
out to the johsite for forklift discharge as to
the dealer, that's a clelinry expense ... " (Ah.
840)

l\1 r. Burch, Sales l\Ianager for Georgia-Pacific's
(
Dfrision similarly testified that the warehousing and freight functions of the distribution centers
were in fact warehousing and freight functions and not
selling functions. ( J\ b. 5UU).

There is no competent evidence in the record to
rebut the foregoing testimony and there is a total absence of any '"·hich would support the trial court's find·
ing that such functions were sales functions rather than
freight awl warehousing functions ...Again, we find some
conjecture by l\lr. Caldwell for he testified that he
"assumed" that such costs were sales costs.

"Q.

(By l\1r. Taylor) Now, your opinions
here in this proceeding are based in a mate-
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rial part, are they not, upon an exclusion
from any consideration other than as a
selling, advertising and general administrative expense all costs, all costs of
operating that warehouse, including the
unloading of a rail car, the storing of the
materials in the warehouse, the loading out
of the warehouse, the transportation between the warehouse and the end user and
any necessary services to the end user?
A.

Except as inclu<led in the ten percent.

Q.

And you've assumed that those items are
either selling expense, advertising expense, or general administrative expense?

A.

Yes, sir." (Ab. 937-38)

Prior to this colloquy he had testified that warehousing
and shipping costs were something other than selling
costs:
"Q.

(Ily Mr. Taylor) Do you have any warehousing clients?

A.

Just a warehouse?

Q.

Yes.

A.

I am not familiar with any right now. I
can't recall.

Q.

In any event, sir, are there costs in a warehouse that are not selling costs?
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A.

'V ell, when you say that they are not
selling costs, Mr. Tay]or, it's very difficult to answer hecause even though you
may be hiring, say a warehouseman to
loa'l arnl un]oacl the procluct, it is all encompassed within the sales function.

Q.

'Ve11. assume a warehouse, sir, doesn't
make any sales at a11, they just store merchandise, are there costs of that warehouse that don't relate to seUing?

A. Yes.
Q. Arni are there costs in that warehouse that
don't relate to advertising?

A.

Y uu mean costs as to the person who
o\vns the warehouse or costs tu the indivirlual who is using the facility?

Q.

I'm talking about the costs of handling
the materials that are in that warehouse.
There are costs in that warehouse. ',yould
that be a fair statement?

A.
Q.

Yes.

And in no place in your projections here
lrnve you taken into consideration any of
the costs of handling merchandise in any
Georgia-Pacific warehouse?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

But you have taken and placed in the income figure the net price paid by the
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customer for that product which benefited
hy those services?

i\.

Yes, sir." (Ah. 368-fH>)

It is obvious from the foregoing that the record
will not support a finding that the warehousing and
shipping costs are "solely a sales function" to be included in the 10% formula, as found by the trial court.
If, as the trial judge found, the ultimate sales price to
the distrihution center customer is to be used in calculating the profit royalty, the warehousing and transportation costs of the distribution centers must be deducted in making that calculation, and the trial court
erred in finding to the contrary.
The second part of this point is argued on the basis
that the trial court erred in finding that the Appellants
had departed from the accounting requirements of the
lease.
In its Finding of Fact 19, the trial court found
that the Appellant had departed from accounting requirements of the lease but the evidence on the record
does not support this finding. There are two provisions
in paragraph 2 ( E) of the lease agreement which govern the method of accounting for the profit royalty.
They state:
"The Lessee and Lessor agree that the net
profit, aforesaid, shall be determined in accordance with sound accounting principles and
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practices in the gypsum industry ... In the
c\·ent of any disagreement between the Lessor
and the I ,essee, or his assigns, hereunder with
respcd to items of either income or deductions
for determining net profit, the parties shall
he hournl hy the final determination of the
Bureau of Internal llevenue for l<'ederal Income Tax purposes for the year in which the
dispute arises." ( C. 24)
l\f r. 'Vilson, Vice-President in charge of Georgia-

Pacific's Gypsum Division, testified that GeorgiaPacific employed the profit center accounting concept.
(Ab. 4-t.4). As explained hy l\Ir. Duncan, who testified
as an accounting expert, this accounting method allo·
cates to each economic unit, i.e. a production plant or
distrihu ti on C'enter, the cost and profits a ttrihutahle
only to that unit hy using as the transfer price the fair
market value of the products at the point of transfer.
(Ah. 776). Under this concept, the Sigurd plant "sells"
its products to the distribution centers in the snme man·
ner as Hestwall had pre,·iously sold to the wholesaler,
i.e. list price less !).8%. (Ah. 165-67). Rather than tak·
iug into account the sales price or the expenses at the
distribution centers, Appellants calculatul the profit
royalty using this transfer price. The trial judge re·
jected this accounting method as he held that the Ap·
pellant must account for the ultimate sales price, but
as he enoneously interpreted the "10% letter agree·
ment", the distribution costs at the distribution centers
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could not he used as an expense to offset the income.
(Finding of Fact No. 24).

Such an approach is wholly inconsistent with the
provisions of the lease directing that net profits be determined in accordance with sound accounting principles
and practices in the gypsum industry ..l\Ir. Duncan, Certified Public Accountant, and a New York partner in
the firm of Arthur Anderson and Co., a nationally
recognized accounting firm, testified that it is,
"improper to include the profits earned by
}Jryor on the sale of paper to Sigurd and improper to include the sales ·by the distribution
centers relating to the Sigurd product." (Ab.
715)

In light of the specific reference in the lease to the
Bureau of Internal Hevenue as supplying interpretive
standards, l\lr. Duncan cited § 482 of the Internal
Rerenue Code as the controlling provision. This code
section allows the Internal Revenue Service to allocate
income and costs between related entities in order to
obtain a proper reflection of taxable income as to each
entity. The Regulations promulgated to effectuate that
code section require the specific profit center accounting procedure as employed by Georgia-Pacific. As
stated in Reg. § 1.482-1 (b) (1):

"The standard to he applied in every case
is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at
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arms length with another uncontrolled taxpayer."
Reg. §
( :J) sets forth the method of a)Jo.
eating income where members of a group of controlled
entities sells or otherwise disposes of tangible property
to another member of such group. Subsection (i) there·
of states in part:
"The district director mny make appropriate alloeations hetween the Seller and the
]lnyer to reflect an arms length price for such
An arms length price is the
sa]e or
price that an unrelated party would have paid
under the same circumstances for the property
involved in the controlled sale. Since unrelated
parties normally sell products at a profit, an
arms length price normally involves a profit
to the seller." (Emphasis added)
Even on the basis of sound accounting principles
alone, and disregnrding the requirement of looking to
the Jnternal Revenue Service for guidance, the profit
center concept of accounting employed by Appellant
would be the proper procedure. l\Ir. Duncan testified
that under sound accounting principles, costs and prices
of the distribution centers should not be used. Uecause
the distribution center operations are a separate business
function from the Sigurd plant, they are involved in
other activities other than the sale of Sigurd goods.

(Ab. 722).
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Summed up ancl in the final analysis, GeorgiaPacific was compelled to adopt modern accounting procedures with their concomita11t change in methods of
marketing. Had it not implemented the latter, it would
have suffered the fate of some of its competitors, namely, closing the Sigurd plant. That it. did not choose to
follow that course resulted in a largess to Respondents
about which they should not complain.
For the foreg<)ing reasons, the trial court erred in
failing to pay heed to the lease provision which required
resort to Internal Revenue Service procedures should
there be any dispute between the parties in determining
sound accounting principles for the purpose of calculating the profit royalty and by not accepting Appellant's
profit center accounting method as being the proper
manner to determine net profits under the terms in the
lease.
By finding that Appellant had improperly accounted for the profit royalty in that it had limited the 10%
formula to sales, advertising and general administrative
costs, and also by rejecting Appellant's profit center
accounting procedure and ignoring the lease's mandate
to resort to IRS accounting principles should a dispute
arise, the trial court erred not only as to the damages
imposed on Appellant as a result thereof, but also obligated the Appellant to depart from the proper method
of accounting as to future years. (Finding of Fact No.
32'. C. 492). Furthermore, based upon these same findings, the trial court rejected, in part, Appellant's counterclaim for overpayment of the profit royalty for the
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years HIG5, J!)()() a11<l 1 !Hi7. As earlier <liscussed, part
of Appellant's counterclaim was hased on the method
of accounting for the costs of paper supplied to the
Sigunl plant hy Appellant's paper division. The trial
court found that the principle of accounting employed
by "Appellant as to such paper costs was correct and
accordingly offset the amounts due Appellant based
upon this part of the counterclaim against the damages
awarded to Respondents. Ilowever, the part of the
counterclaim based upon the method of accounting for
the distribution center costs, as discussed in this Point,
was denied. For the reasons herein stated, the trial court
erred in so denying Appellant's counterclaim and award·
ing damages and declaratory relief to Respondents.
\Ve, therefore, request the court to reverse the trial
judge on those holdings.
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CONCLUSION"
lt is respectfully urged that this Court reverse the

trial court's judgment in favor of Respondents for the
reasons herein stated and enter judgment in favor of

Appellant on its counterclaim.

· Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE ,V. LATIMER
KEITH E. TAYLOR
ROY B. MOORE
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE &
LATll\IER
l\"earns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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APPENDIX B
The following recomputed Exhibits 139 and 140
show the cliffercnces in damages for the years 1968,
1969 and }!)70 if the trial judge had used the actual price
declines of products from Sigurd plant rather than those
based on Mr. Caldwell's assumption that the price decline in the \Vest was solely attributable to GeorgiaPacific. For the purposes of this Appendix, we use the
following assumptions but in doing so, we do not intend
to waive or yield on the points we raise in this appeal.
1.

That the requirements provision of the
lease is to be interpreted as found by the
trial court, and

2.

That the profit level in 1968, 1969 and
1970 should have been the same as in the
years 1962, 1968 and 1964.

RECOMPUTATION OF EXHIBIT 139 SHOWING CHANGE IN DAl\1.AGES REFLECTING
ACTUAL DECLINE IN SALE PRICE OF SIGURD PRODUCTS':'

I

Recalculated

Original

Net sales of board and
lathe by Sigurd plant
in SM units

1968

1968

123,116

I

Average 7% lease
rental per SM board I
and Lathe unit 19621964 adjusted for
price declines in 1968
1969 and 1970
(Exhibit 140)
$

123,116

1

Original

1969

Recalculated ·Original
I

1969

110,549

110,549

$

$

1970

· · al
"Rttalculatcd 0 ng:m
1970
Totals

I

118,122

Reel
a cu I•d
a.e
Totals

118,122

.

7% lease rentals
A.

.7907

.212

$

97,387

Less amounts paid
Balance
$97,387

.6763

.049

$

.4604

$

26,111

74,764

6,416

54,383

-0-

$574,554

$380,547

$26,111

$74,764

$ 6,416

$54,383

-0-

$215,795
$358,759

$215,795
$164,752

29,983
.049

22,410
$ .4604

Additional for years

1968, 1969, 1970 to
bring unit sales to
1967 level:
Additional SM units
17,366
Rental per SM unit $
.7907

$

B. Additional 7% lease
rental
$ 13,731
C.

Additional tonnage
royalty

related

·SM. units

in

B

t

01

$

- I.

Year

$

- ......
$

Totals
Average
Average rental
per SM unit

A. Effect on rental per SM

29,983
.6763

$

$20,278

1.739

$ 1,236

2.997

$

.......,..,.

.

22,410
-0-0-

..........
-

-

---

$ 44,327

2.:ZJO

-

$

$

1968

unit for decrease in sales
price from 1967: (Ex. 141)

Recalculated
1968

121,271
372,457
124,152

104,796
$336,127
$112,042

4.4%

27.7%*

1969

I

I

Recalculated
1969

33.7%*

8.9%

6946

127.782
123,404

$117,114
114,217

Original

4,918

Lathe (1)

$
Original

$

-

6949

--

Rental

1,601,878
$5,137,934
$1,712,645

$ 4,821,317

I

-

$1,790,169
1,745,887

4,699,106
$14,463,950

$

$10,318

Rental

$ 4,932,222
4,832,622

1962
1963

1964

17,366
.212

$ 3,682

1.739

--

-0-

.9025

Original

1970

Recalculated
1970

17.4%

39.0%*

B. Average sales price above

$4,821,317

$4,821,317

$4,821,317

$4,821,317

$4,821,317

$4,821,317

C. Average net profit above

$1,712,645

$1,712,645

$1,712,645

$1,712,645

$1,712,645

$1,712,645

D. Decrease in profits due to
decrease in selling price
(A times B)

$ 212,138

$1,335,504

$ 429,097

$1,624,783

$ 838,909

$1,880,313

E. Adjusted net profits (C-D )

$1;500,507

$ 337,141

$1,283,548

$

87,862

$ 873,736

($ 167,668)

83,970

$

6,150

$

$

.049

$

F. 7% Lease Rental
(7% times E)

Per SM Unit of board and
lathe

$
$

98,164
.79<YI

$

26,339

$

$

.212

$

.6763

57,160
.4604

(1) From plant manufacturing expense report, board and !ates loading department
• actual average net price of Gypsum Board per SM sold from Sigurd (Ex. 136):

1967 $35.98
1968 26.00
1969
23.83
1970
21.92

-0-

-0-

